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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE IMPORT OF HISTORY TO CORPORATE LAW
DALIA TSUK MITCHELL*
INTRODUCTION
Teaching directors’ duties has become increasingly perplexing. In a series
of decisions beginning in the 1990s, the Delaware courts, attempting to infuse
new meanings into traditional concepts—namely, good faith, due care, and
loyalty—have left the terrain of directors’ duties in disarray.1 To make sense of
rulings that appear inconsistent, one can take solace in Justice Holmes’s oftenrepeated aphorism: “The life of law has not been logic; it has been
experience.”2 In corporate law, experience shows that the courts’ changing
views of directors’ duties reflect a broader shift—from a corporate law
grounded in business practice to one anchored in, and ultimately trumped by,
modern finance theory.
In my Corporations class, I start the discussion of directors’ duties with the
duty of loyalty—the authentic fiduciary obligation. We cover cases addressing
self-dealing transactions, corporate opportunity, and executive compensation.
We then proceed to the tort-based duty of care. We start with Francis v. United
Jersey Bank3 or Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,4 which I
discuss in this Article, to explore the tort and business origins of the duty of
care. My class then turns to the business judgment rule, reading Kamin v.
American Express Company5 and Joy v. North6 to explore justifications for the
rule, and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.7 to examine the relationship between
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
1. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight,
55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 561–62 (2008).
2. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a
nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only
the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”)
3. 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981).
4. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
5. 86 Misc. 2d 809 (1976).
6. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982).
7. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
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the rule and the duty of care. The remainder of our discussion of directors’
duties is devoted to what I label the “dormant duty of care”—that is, what was
left of the duty of care after the enactment of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law.8 We examine the dormant duty of care in In re
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,9 In re Walt Disney
Derivative Litigation,10 Stone v. Ritter,11 and In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder
Derivative Litigation.12 Reading these cases in chronological order allows us to
explore recent changes in Delaware law as well as the disorder they left
behind.
The evolution of the directors’ duty to monitor—from Graham to
Caremark to Stone and Citigroup—is germane to our discussion of directors’
duties and Delaware’s law more broadly. In the second half of the twentieth
century, the standard applicable to claims involving breach of the duty to
monitor has shifted from negligence (in Graham) to business judgment to good
faith (in Caremark), and the duty itself was altered from a subset of the duty of
care (in Graham and Caremark) to a subcategory of the duty of loyalty (in
Stone and Citigroup). The latter change is particularly perplexing but, as I
suggest to my students, the broader historical shift from business to finance in
which these decisions are situated might alleviate at least some of the
confusion. As my class explores the influence of business practice in the midcentury years,13 law’s emphasis on structure and process in the 1970s and
1980s,14 and ultimately the triumph of finance over law in the 1990s,15 we
examine how the rhetoric of care, business judgment, and good faith helped
assure investors that they could trust their corporate managers while
simultaneously rendering the duty to monitor (and the duty of care more
broadly) inconsequential. Law’s role was reduced to enabling the development
of powerful corporations, outside the law.
This Article examines how I teach the development of the duty to monitor,
but the themes I explore, divided into specific lessons (or parts in this Article),
are not limited to the cases I discuss below. Drawing on business and legal
theory, specifically different ideas about the role of the board of directors and
finance, these lessons can be used to explain other changes in corporate law

8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2014); see LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & DALIA T.
MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 277–360 (2d ed. 2011) (identifying and
examining the dormant duty of care).
9. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
10. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
11. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
12. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part IV.
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beginning in the second half of the twentieth century and culminating at the
turn of the twenty-first century.
I. GRAHAM AND MID-CENTURY MANAGERIALISM—THE INFLUENCE OF
BUSINESS PRACTICE ON LEGAL DOCTRINE
The modern discourse of directors’ duties begins with mid-century
managerialism, an ideology that business theorists embraced amidst the
growing decentralization of corporations and the development of complex
managerial structures.16 Focusing on management’s expertise, business
theorists and social scientists put corporate management at the center of the
corporation, empowering management to control business affairs, to exercise
authority over others in the corporate structure, and to use corporate power
over those outside the firm.17
By midcentury, the term “free enterprise”—in use since the 1930s—came
to symbolize the free reign of managers, who in the cultural imagination
replaced the small producers and entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century.18 In
the post-war years, as “Marxist-inspired theoretical conceptualizations [were
rendered] ideologically suspect,”19 not ownership of property or social status,
but an ability to run an enterprise legitimized managers’ powers.20 The new
managerial class was a loose class of leaders, presumably free from the
constraints of the old world.21 For the most part, senior management faithfully
carried on the responsibilities associated with their position.22
Influenced by managerialist theories articulated by business scholars, midcentury corporate law scholars, who lumped together directors and officers
under the rubric of management, viewed managers as experts who, while “not
amenable to direct shareholder control, nevertheless serve shareholder
interests.”23 The “shareholder interest” was not determined by reference to
16. See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, THE CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 41–71 (1972) (first
published in 1946, examining General Motors’ complex managerial structure).
17. William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989).
18. Cf. Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-Labor Law?, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 763,
771 (1998) (explaining the use of the term “free enterprise” to describe the American capitalist
system).
19. Rick Fantasia, From Class Consciousness to Culture, Action, and Social Organization,
21 ANN. REV. SOC. 269 (1995).
20. Daniel Bell, The Power Elite—Reconsidered, 64 AM. J. SOC. 238, 247 (1958).
21. Davita Silfen Glasberg & Michael Schwartz, Ownership and Control of Corporations, 9
ANN. REV. SOC. 311, 313 (1983).
22. Brian R. Cheffins, The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks and the Financial
Crisis (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 56/2013), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2365738.
23. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277,
1307 (1984).
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shareholders’ subjective, and potentially conflicting, desires. Rather, it was an
“objectified abstraction” determined by “the bureaucratic managers” and
“attributed to all shareholders of all corporations whether they want it or
not.”24 Management had full discretion to determine the “shareholder interest,”
while “shareholder interest” presumably constrained management’s power.25
Reflecting this circularity of power and restraint, courts developed the
presumption of the business judgment rule to allow corporate managers to run
their businesses with little if any intervention from the shareholders.26
The leading jurisdiction in the 1940s and 1950s was New York, where the
courts, in an attempt to give more discretion to management, gradually allowed
exemptions to directors’ liability to encroach upon the standard of care
applicable to their actions.27 Earlier cases viewed the business judgment rule as
“an adjunct to finding that diligence in the decision-making process had in fact
been exercised.”28 If reasonable care was exercised in the decision-making
process, a court would not examine “the merits of the decision” as that would
involve assessing business judgment.29 In later cases, despite attempts to keep
the duty of care alive, the business judgment rule gained a force of its own. It
became a means of shielding directors from liability, of changing the standard
of liability applicable to their actions. Not only honest mistakes but all actions,
unless they were fraudulent or tainted with a conflict of interest, were exempt
from liability.30
Delaware’s history was different. By the time Graham came before the
Supreme Court of Delaware, the court, fully embracing managerialism’s
emphasis on directors’ discretion, had not yet developed the precepts of its
duty of care jurisprudence but had a “‘business judgment’ jurisprudence”
independent of that duty.31 Graham, a case involving directorial lack of
monitoring, required the court to begin developing its duty of care
jurisprudence as no business decision was made.32 As Lyman Johnson writes,
Graham was the first Delaware case to “explicitly acknowledge” the duty of
care.33

24. Id. at 1308.
25. Id. at 1306–07.
26. Id.
27. Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’
Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 63, 113–23 (2009).
28. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards
and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 603 (1983).
29. Id.
30. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 119–20.
31. Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 639 (2000).
32. Id. at 639.
33. Id. See also Henry Ridgely Horsey, The Duty of Care Component of the Delaware
Business Judgment Rule, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 971, 982–83 (1994) (“No Delaware court decision
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Graham was a derivative suit against the directors of Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Company for damages caused to the corporation by the nondirector employees’ and the corporation’s violations of antitrust regulations on
a price-fixing conspiracy in the electrical equipment industry. The shareholder
plaintiffs charged that the directors were liable for breach of their duties “by
reason of their failure to take action designed to learn and prevent anti-trust
activity on the part of any employees of Allis-Chalmers.”34
The court, unable to defer to the board’s business judgment, treated
Graham as a typical tort case using a negligence standard to evaluate directors’
inaction.35 Yet, a heightened standard did not result in stricter duties.
Embracing the ideology of managerialism, the court stressed that AllisChalmers Manufacturing Company was a highly decentralized corporation
with authority delegated to the “lowest possible management level capable of
fulfilling the delegated responsibility.”36 Given “the extent and complexity of
the company’s operations,” the board’s role was limited to considering and
deciding “matters concerning the general business policy of the company.”37
Justice Wolcott did not see fault in such practice concluding that, due to the
company’s structure, the board could not “consider in detail specific problems
of the various divisions.”38
The duties of Allis-Chalmers’ directors were “fixed by the nature of the
enterprise which employed in excess of 30,000 persons and extended over a
large geographical area.”39 Justice Wolcott accepted that “[b]y force of
necessity,” the directors could not know all the company’s employees or be
aware of their actions.40 “The very magnitude of the enterprise required them
to confine their control to the broad policy decisions” and entitled them (by
virtue also of section 141(f) of Delaware General Corporations Law) to rely on
“summaries, reports, and corporate records.”41 Imposing a limited duty to
respond rather than an affirmative duty to monitor, Justice Wolcott reasoned:
“[D]irectors are entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their

espouses the existence of a director’s fiduciary duty to act in an informed manner and with the
care of a prudent man until the decision of our separately constituted supreme court in 1963 in
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.”).
34. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 127 (Del. 1963). These employees
and the corporation entered guilty pleas to the antitrust indictments. Id.
35. Id. at 130.
36. Id. at 128.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is
wrong.”42
The history of finance helps explain how corporations and corporate law
could so easily refuse to hold directors liable without any concern about
potential repercussions from investors. Managerialism and its associated
deference to directors’ expert judgment went hand in hand with reliance on
internal finance, which shielded the control group from the discipline of the
stock market and public shareholders. Corporations obtained external financing
largely from banks with whom corporate management had close relationships
and whose representatives often sat on corporate boards. Corporate
management was running corporations for the sake of business, without
undertaking unnecessary risks, and politicians did not wish to disturb
American business during one of its greatest periods of expansion.43
The business judgment rule, as it developed during the mid-century years,
and the court’s decision in Graham reflected the dominant business practice
and the managerialist theory that legitimated it. The following part (or lesson)
explores developments taking place a couple of decades later when the legal
community’s vision of the directors’ role and its financial underpinning was
transformed, leading the courts to embrace the monitoring model of the board
and to alter corporate law’s focus from business practice to finance. As my
class explores, Caremark brought these changes to bear upon the duty to
monitor.
II. THE 1970S AND 1980S REVOLUTION—FROM BUSINESS PRACTICE TO
LEGAL STRUCTURES
Beginning in the 1970s, the corporate board came to the forefront of
academic and political debates—the focus of policymakers’ attention.44 Social
and political upheavals led public-interest shareholder groups to use the SEC’s
proxy and shareholder proposal rules to voice their opposition to corporate
practices related to the Vietnam War, environmental protection, occupational
safety, and equal employment. Institutional investors became major players in
corporate governance, raising new questions about the control of corporate
America. Several corporate bankruptcies, including the sudden and unexpected
collapse of Penn Central, raised grave doubts about their boards’ performance,

42. Id.
43. Lawrence E. Mitchell & Dalia T. Mitchell, The Financial Determinants of American
Corporate Governance: A Brief History, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SYNTHESIS OF
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 19, 27–28 (H. Kent Baker and Ronald Anderson, eds.,
2010).
44. As an example of this growing attention, see Officers’ and Directors’ Responsibilities
and Liabilities, BUS. LAW., Feb. 1972, at 1, 1–178.
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while corporate scandals involving illegal political contributions revealed
during the Watergate investigation exacerbated such doubts.45
A variety of studies concluded that the boards of directors of large and
medium-sized corporations were no longer a significant check on the CEO;
they did not even have much say in selecting the executives because the proxy
machinery was controlled by management. Outside directors were ineffective.
They were typically chosen from the same social networks as the top
executives and sitting with the latter on several boards; they were thus unlikely
to challenge the executives. Finally, studies revealed that most boards did not
meet frequently enough to perform a meaningful role.46
Several proposals for reform followed,47 ultimately converging on the
monitoring model of the board. It described directors as “overseers of the
corporation and monitors of corporate management” and recommended that a
significant number of outside directors serve on the board.48 But consensus
was limited to the fact that independent directors should play an important role
in reviewing the activities of the executives. What that meant as far as the
duties and liabilities of directors, and to whom directors owed those duties,
remained contested issues throughout the 1980s.49
While some legal scholars wanted to use the monitoring model
substantially to redefine directors’ duties,50 corporate lawyers and business
groups were strongly opposed to any attempt to tinker with the very limited
directorial duties. They focused on the monitoring role of non-management
directors and suggested that good boards should have a specific number of

45. Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of
Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 328–35 (1987).
46. Id. at 330–32. See also Horsey, supra note 33, at 991; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Trouble with Boards, in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17, 29–30 (F. Scott Keiff
& Troy A. Paredes eds., 2010) (noting, among others, the 1971 study by Myles Mace regarding
corporate boards’ passivity).
47. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 701–03 (1974) (proposing the enactment of federal “minimum standards” for
officers and directors of firms of a certain size); RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 66, 76–77, 120, 126–27 (1976) (reintroducing the idea that firms of a certain
income and employee-base should be federally incorporated; the federal statute was to include
specific requirements regarding board composition and the board’s role); Harvey J. Goldschmid,
The Greening of the Board Room: Reflections on Corporate Responsibility, 10 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 15, 25–26 (1973) (suggesting requiring boards to be composed entirely of outside
directors who would review the executives’ decisions).
48. See, e.g., Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 32 BUS. LAW. 5, 31, 33 (1976) and its
revised edition, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1619, 1622–27 (1978)
[hereinafter Corporate Director’s Guidebook II]. See also Seligman, supra note 45, at 341.
49. Mitchell, supra note 46, at 52.
50. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern
Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 403–18 (1975).
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them.51 Moreover, as the business community saw it, the monitoring board had
one task—the directors’ role was “to monitor, in an environment of loyal but
independent oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the
corporation in behalf of those who invest in the corporation.”52 Directors were
not to be representatives of different corporate constituencies. According to the
business community and its lawyers, directors’ monitoring powers were meant
to achieve share price maximization.53
During the 1980s, the Delaware courts brought the legal community’s
emphasis on independent oversight “to bear upon their analysis of directors’
duties and the business judgment rule.”54 Fully embracing the model as a
structural rather than substantive one, the Delaware courts focused on the role
of the independent directors (independence narrowly defined as lack of control
or domination by an individual interested in the transaction).55 If a majority of
independent disinterested directors, following the courts’ procedural
requirements, approved the board’s actions, the courts declared such actions to
be shielded from further judicial inquiry.56
Delaware’s embrace of the monitoring model as a means of shielding
directors from liability reached further. In Aronson v. Lewis, the Supreme
Court of Delaware declared that the business judgment rule—“an
acknowledgment of the managerial prerogatives of Delaware directors” —was

51. See, e.g., Corporate Director’s Guidebook II, supra note 48, at 1619, 1622.
52. Id. at 1621.
53. Mitchell, supra note 46, at 44–45. On the relationship between the monitoring board and
share price maximization, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’
Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 554–56 (1984); Ira M. Millstein & Paul
W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded
Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (1998); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent
Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1526–35 (2007).
54. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 138.
55. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188–89 (Del. 1988). See also, Usha Rodrigues, The
Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 465 (2008) (examining the Delaware courts’
inquiry into independence); Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A
Director’s Duty of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (1989) (advocating a director’s
separate duty of independence).
56. Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (noting that when
directors adopt a defensive tactic, their ability to fulfill their Unocal duties is “materially
enhanced . . . where . . . a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside
independent directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing standards.”); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 n.3 (Del. 1986) (“[C]ertain
presumptions . . . generally attach to the decisions of a board whose majority consists of truly
outside independent directors.”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154
(Del. 1989) (noting that the evidence supporting the conclusion that in making its decision the
Time’s board was not uninformed “is materially enhanced by the fact that twelve of Time’s
sixteen board members were outside independent directors.”).
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a presumption “that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”57 Placing the
burden of rebutting the presumption on the party challenging the decision, the
court held that “[a]bsent an abuse of discretion, [directors’] judgment will be
respected by the courts.”58 The court further announced that “[w]hile the
Delaware cases use a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of
care, our analysis satisfies us that under the business judgment rule director
liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”59
The “informed” element was not part of the business judgment rule
doctrine until Aronson introduced it. In adding it, Aronson laid the foundation
for the ultimate equation of the substantive duty of care with the procedural (or
structural) duty to be informed.60 Precedent also did not support the court’s
conclusion that gross negligence was the standard of care applicable to
directors.61 But a year later, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, the case that shocked the
business and legal communities by finding directors liable for breach of the
duty of care, the Supreme Court of Delaware confirmed its own proclamation
in Aronson that “under the business judgment rule director liability is
predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”62 Moreover, the court in Van
Gorkom concluded that “the concept of gross negligence is also the proper

57. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Johnson, supra note 31, at 641. According to Johnson, Aronson changed the traditional
presumption that directors acted “in good faith” in the exercise of their best judgment “for what
they believed to be the interest of the corporation” and all its stockholders into a presumption that
“in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Id. at
639–40. For the traditional formulation of the rule, see, e.g., Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp.,
140 A. 264, 267 (Del. 1927).
61. Samuel Arsht’s review of Delaware cases a few years before Aronson was decided
revealed that most of the cases cited in Aronson dealt with “parent-subsidiary transactions where
a determination of fairness is meaningless or impossible . . . .” In these situations, the courts had
“characterize[ed] the ‘gross and palpable overreaching’ standard as a ‘business judgment’ test.”
But, as Arsht demonstrated, this was not a generally applicable test. Other cases cited in Aronson
simply stated that the court would not interfere with the board’s judgment absent evidence of
fraud or gross abuse of discretion. One case suggested that directors might be liable for gross
negligence, but did not negate the possibility of liability for negligence. S. Samuel Arsht, The
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 102, 112–13 (1980). Even the
Delaware Supreme Court admitted that “the Delaware cases have not been precise in articulating
the standard by which the exercise of business judgment is governed.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812
n.6. Nonetheless it chose to characterize the cases as “hold[ing] that director liability is predicated
on a standard which is less exacting than simple negligence.” Id.
62. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
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standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of
directors was an informed one.”63
The mid-century rule of deference to expert opinion had become in the
1980s a structural procedural defense precluding judicial inquiry into the
directors’ challenged actions. Unless a plaintiff arguing a breach of the duty of
care could demonstrate that the directors were grossly negligent (that is,
grossly negligent with respect to the requirement to be informed), the directors
would have the presumption of the business judgment rule and the court would
not second-guess their actions. The following parts (or lessons) explore how,
by the time Caremark was decided, the presumption of the business judgment
rule helped dissociate the high rhetoric surrounding the duty to monitor from
potential liability.
III. AFTER THE REVOLUTION—THE DUTY TO MONITOR IN CAREMARK
Caremark involved the settlement of a shareholders derivative suit to
recover damages from Caremark’s directors for fines the corporation incurred
in settling federal and state lawsuits addressing kickback payments that
violated the terms of the Anti-Referral Payments Law. Invoking Graham, the
plaintiff shareholder argued that the losses were a result of the board’s failure
to monitor Caremark’s officers and employees.64
Caremark International—a health care corporation—was a highly
decentralized corporation with “approximately 7,000 employees and ninety
branch operations.”65 Its size was not remarkable, though. Beginning in the
1970s, U.S. publicly held corporations were growing larger. They were also
“operating in a more volatile market environment due to deregulation,
increased competition and technological advances reducing barriers to entry in
many industries.”66 While such developments might have triggered closer
scrutiny of the executives, the Delaware courts, as the following elaborates,
saw matters differently. Shielding the board from liability, the courts
empowered the executives to act without fearing intervention (or even
monitoring) from their monitors.
Chancellor Allen began his decision by emphasizing that, at the twentiethcentury’s end (more than three decades after Graham was decided), boards
could not “satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the
corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information” so that
63. Id. Interestingly, what “gross negligence” meant remained an open question. Rabkin v.
Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 970 (Del. Ch. 1986).
64. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
65. Id. at 962.
66. Cheffins, supra note 22, at 11.
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the latter could “reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s
compliance with law and its business performance.”67 Directors had an
affirmative duty to ensure systematic monitoring.68
High ideals of business practices did not support heightened duties. Just as
Allen required directors to install reporting systems, he ensured that proving
directors’ failure to act would be nearly impossible. Graham used a negligence
standard to evaluate directors’ failure to monitor. But if, as Allen held,
directors had an affirmative duty to design information and reporting systems,
their decisions as to the appropriate reporting systems would be subject to the
presumption of the business judgment rule and evaluated using a standard of
gross negligence.69 Furthermore, because section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law, which was enacted in 1986, allowed corporations to
exculpate directors for monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care, but
not for acting in bad faith, Allen substituted good faith for gross negligence. So
long as the board exercised “a good faith judgment” as to the adequacy of the
corporation’s information and reporting system, it could not be held liable for
the system’s failure to reveal violations of law or duties by officers or
employees.70
Relying on good faith to replace both the duty of care and the business
judgment rule, Allen stressed that the standard of good faith did not require an
assessment of the substance of the board’s decision. “[C]ompliance with a
director’s duty of care[,]” Allen wrote, “can never appropriately be judicially
determined by reference to the content of the board decision that leads to a
corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the
process employed.”71 After-the-fact determinations that the decision was
“substantively wrong,” “stupid,” “egregious,” or “irrational” did not entail
liability.72 Rather, the standard of good faith required a determination by the
court that the process in which a compliance system was adopted “was either
rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”73
“[O]nly a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and
reporting system exi[s]ts—will establish the lack of good faith that is a
necessary condition to liability.”74
67. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 969–71.
70. Id. at 970–71.
71. Id. at 967.
72. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 971. For examinations of good faith, see Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M.
Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the ‘New’ Good
Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 232–37 (2006); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good
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The tort based duty of care, subsumed first under the business judgment
rule and now under good faith, was no longer relevant. In a footnote, Allen put
it to sleep. “The vocabulary of negligence while often employed,” he noted, “is
not well-suited to judicial review of board attentiveness,” especially, albeit not
only, if such usage implies looking at “the substance of the decision as any
evidence of possible ‘negligence.’”75 A substantive standard of care no longer
attached to the directors’ duty of care or their duty to monitor. As long as
directors, insiders and outsiders alike, did not consciously disregard their
duties, the Delaware courts would not reevaluate their decisions or lack
thereof. The monitoring board’s duty to monitor became merely rhetorical.
How could rhetoric so easily be separated from duties, ideals from
practice, without triggering investors’ irk? The following part (or lesson)
explores how Delaware’s analysis in the last decades of the twentieth century,
as exhibited in Caremark, limited the shareholders’ interests to the
maximization of profit. Shareholders were instructed to find security neither in
business practice nor in the structure of the board and its decision-making
processes, but in finance.
IV. FROM BUSINESS PRACTICE, THROUGH STRUCTURE, TO FINANCE
A rule of deference to the directors’ expert judgment, as articulated in
Graham, seemed to fit a time when corporations (and directors) relied on
internal finance. The monitoring model of the board was established on a very
different financial background—one in which public stock ownership,
especially institutional ownership, was steadily increasing. By 1965, more than
ten percent of the population owned stock. In 2002, more than twenty-nine
percent of the total population directly owned stock. In 1950, institutional
investors held approximately eight percent of equities. Four decades later,
institutions held more than forty-five percent of total equities in the United
States.76

Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 719 (2007). For an innovative analysis of the benefits of the business
judgment’s rule emphasis on process, see Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic
and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 675 (2002).
75. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 n.16.
76. Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 43, at 30. For detailed discussions of these
developments, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical
Evidence, 1 ACCT., ECONS., & LAW: A CONVIVIUM (2010); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of
Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Agency Capitalism: Further Implications of Equity Intermediation (Colum. Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 461, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2359690.
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Directors were no longer seen as entrusted with the task of making expert
business decisions. Rather, they were deemed responsible for maximizing
value for the shareholders. Takeovers, stock buybacks, and leverage became
management’s means of satisfying stock price appreciation, and
stockholders—especially
institutional
shareholders—demanded
it.
Corporations were using their retained earnings and debt to return value to
shareholders, to defend against hostile tender offers, or to finance takeovers.
From its highs of the mid-century, internal finance gradually dropped, reaching
the teens in the 1990s. Debt replaced retained earnings as corporations’ main
means of finance, while the stock market was becoming the principal governor
of corporate behavior and stock price appreciation—an end in and of itself.77
Seeking to constrain market demands, and perhaps stabilize a rapidly
volatile stock market, progressive corporate jurists proposed allowing different
stakeholders, as well as the community at large, to make demands on
corporations and their managers.78 As my class explores, the Delaware courts
(and legislature) chose a different course, enabling directors and officers to
exercise their power without limits. In cases addressing creditors’ attempts to
hold directors liable for harm to their investments, courts used the language of
contracts to absolve directors from accountability to creditors, attaching
fiduciary obligations to proprietary interests.79 At the same time, as I elaborate
below, while promising shareholders stock price maximization, the courts
relied on the rhetoric of risk and return to justify shielding directors from
liability to their shareholders, making it nearly impossible even for activist
shareholders to hold management accountable.
Modern portfolio theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”),
both developed in the 1950s and 1960s, helped shift academic focus from
business fundamentals to the investors’ ability to diversify risks inherent in
particular companies (nonsystematic risks) and risks affecting the market as a
whole (systematic risks). Rather than focus on the fundamentals of companies
77. Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 43, at 20, 32. See also Mitchell, supra note 76
(providing and examining the empirical evidence supporting this argument).
78. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 35, 38–40 (Lawrence
E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (discussing proposed changes to corporate governance structures).
79. See, e.g., Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 303, 304 (Del. 1988). “A debenture is a credit
instrument which does not devolve upon its holder an equity interest in the issuing corporation.”
Id. Similarly, a convertible debenture represented “a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a
debt and . . . not . . . an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the imposition
of a trust relationship with concomitant fiduciary duties.” Id. To trigger a fiduciary duty, “an
existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must exist.” Id. See also
Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“[W]ith respect to
matters relating to preferences or limitations that distinguish preferred stock from common, the
duty of the corporation and its directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is
appropriately defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that contract . . . .”).
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in which they invested, investors were advised to study the historical
performance of their companies’ stock price.80
The judiciary’s embrace of CAPM happened concurrently with the
development of mutual funds and the rapid growth in institutional investors’
stock ownership. In Joy v. North, Judge Winter, writing for the Second Circuit,
turned to the rhetoric of risk to justify the business judgment rule.81 Winter
reasoned that shareholders voluntarily assumed the risks of business failures
(and the potential for their success). Because rational shareholders would offset
their exposure to business misfortunes by diversifying their portfolios (as
modern finance theory dictated), corporate law did not need to protect them
from such letdowns.82
The Delaware courts, too, embraced the idea that the maximization of
stock price was the shared goal of rational investors who, as portfolio theory
suggested, could use diversification to defend against investment risks.83 Take,
for example, Gagliardi v. TriFoods International, Inc., a case referenced in
Caremark.84 Shareholders, Chancellor Allen wrote in Gagliardi, “can diversify
the risks of their corporate investments.”85 It was “[t]hus in their economic
interest for the corporation to accept in rank order all positive net present value
investment projects available to the corporation, starting with the highest risk
adjusted rate of return first.”86 Given that making risky investments was in the
rational investor’s best interests, it was also
in the shareholders' economic interest to offer sufficient protection to directors
from liability for negligence, etc., to allow directors to conclude that, as a
practical matter, there is no risk that, if they act in good faith and meet minimal
proceduralist standards of attention, they can face liability as a result of a
87
business loss.

While Graham addressed directors’ duties by looking at the fundamentals
of the particular corporation, Allen’s analysis in Gagliardi and Caremark
emphasized the need to allow directors to take risks to offer higher
appreciation for their stockholders and the ability of different investors to
protect themselves. The rhetoric of risk and return was employed to justify
protecting directors from liability.

80. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC.
342, 345–46 (2005) (describing the development of finance theory).
81. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. Id. at 886.
83. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 80, at 350.
84. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
85. Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
86. Id.
87. Id.
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In short, as the Delaware courts declared that the duty to monitor, and the
duty of care more broadly, could no longer be assessed by reference to
substantive, business-specific risks, they helped make the stock market the
predominant tool of evaluating directors’ actions and inactions. Appropriate
risks were to be assessed in relationship to stock-value maximization.
Corporations, Allen pronounced, should be free to take risks. If directors (and
officers)
in charge of the corporation are to be adjudged personally liable for losses on
the basis of a substantive judgment based upon what [] persons of ordinary or
average judgment and average risk assessment talent regard as ‘prudent’
‘sensible’ or even ‘rational’, such persons will have a strong incentive at the
88
margin to authorize less risky investment projects.

It was a subtle, albeit significant, transition from a corporate-specific duty to
market duty, substantiated by the growing impact of modern finance theory on
corporate law. As the last part (or lesson) demonstrates, by the turn of the
twenty-first century, the cumulative impact of these changes left the law of
directors’ duties muddled and increasingly immaterial.
V. DORMANT DUTIES—WHEN MARKETS AND FINANCE TRUMP LAW
Having introduced, or reintroduced, the concept of good faith as a means
of resurrecting the dormant duty of care, the Delaware courts were faced with
the challenge of defining the duty to act in good faith. In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litigation offered a golden opportunity to address the matter.89 The
key question in the case was whether Disney’s directors breached their duties
by hiring Michael Ovitz as president and firing him fourteen months later with
a severance package of roughly $130 million.90 Earlier in the litigation, the
court dismissed the duty of loyalty claims.91 At the same time, Disney’s charter
exempted directors from liability for breaches of the duty of care (pursuant to
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law).92 Resurrecting a
separate good faith standard was the only means of imposing liability on the
board of directors. Chancellor Chandler was skillful in crafting the standard,
and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. According to Disney, a director
might fail to act in good faith if he or she “intentionally acts with a purpose
other than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation[,] . . . acts with
the intent to violate applicable positive law, or . . . intentionally fails to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his
88. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968 n.16.
89. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006).
90. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. Ch. 2006).
91. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998).
92. In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 46 nn.37–38.
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duties.”93 The latter possibility was particularly pertinent in Disney, but the
court, even if reluctantly, determined that the Disney directors did not fail to
fulfill their duty of good faith.94
Stone v. Ritter, involving a duty to monitor, continued to develop the
contours of good faith.95 The plaintiffs raised a “classic Caremark claim,”
seeking to hold the directors of AmSouth Bancorporation liable for civil
penalties assessed against the corporation “for operating an inadequate antimoney-laundering program” and for failing to file Suspicious Activity Reports,
as required by the Federal Bank Secrecy Act.96 Reinterpreting the Caremark
standard after Disney, Justice Holland reiterated Disney’s definition of good
faith.97 Yet, Holland determined that the obligation to act in good faith did not
establish an independent fiduciary duty; rather, it was “a condition, ‘of the
fundamental duty of loyalty.’”98 Diverging from long-standing precedent,
including Caremark, that correctly treated the duty to monitor as a tort duty,
diverging also from Disney that appropriately treated good faith as an
independent duty, Stone made little conceptual sense. But, as my class
concludes, it did not matter. The courts’ turn from tort and business practice to
finance and the market made doctrine (and law) irrelevant.
Justice Holland reiterated Caremark’s conclusion that the test of liability
upheld in Stone—“lack of good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight”—was “quite high.”99 In
Stone, while the reporting system was insufficient and ineffective, the plaintiff
shareholder failed to prove that the directors consciously disregarded their duty
to monitor.100 Yet, according to the court, the high bar was in the shareholders’
best interests. Citing again to Caremark, the court noted that in making “board
service by qualified persons more likely, while continuing to act as a stimulus
to good faith performance of duty by such directors[,]” it ensured that
shareholders would continue to profit.101
In re Citigroup Shareholder Derivative Litigation came next.102 Citigroup,
a global financial services company, suffered vast losses during the collapse of
the housing market in 2008. In two years, Citigroup’s market capitalization
was reduced from more than $240 billion to less than $20 billion, its stock

93. Id. at 67.
94. Id. at 67–68.
95. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
96. Id. at 364–66.
97. Id. at 369–70.
98. Id. at 370.
99. Id. at 372 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del.
Ch. 1996)).
100. Stone, 911 A.2d at 372–73.
101. Id. at 372 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971).
102. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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price plummeting. Many of these losses were associated with mortgage-backed
securities and off-balance sheet assets.103 Citigroup’s shareholders brought an
action against the company’s directors and officers alleging, among others, that
the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by failing properly to monitor
and manage the risks associated with the subprime lending market.104
Writing for Delaware’s Chancery Court in the midst of the recession that
followed the 2008 financial crisis, Chancellor Chandler held that Citigroup’s
directors and officers did not breach their fiduciary obligations. Under
Delaware law, Citigroup’s directors and officers could not be held liable for
failing to monitor or, as Chandler described the allegations, making risky
business decisions simply because their actions (or inactions) turned poor
results (or financial crises).105
Whether or not the plaintiffs raised a Caremark claim no longer mattered.
Stone ensured that both actions and inactions of disinterested directors would
be assessed using a good faith standard, now a subset of the duty of loyalty.
“[O]ne can see a similarity between the standard for assessing oversight
liability and the standard for assessing a disinterested director’s decision under
the duty of care when the company has adopted an exculpatory provision
pursuant to § 102(b)(7)[,]” Chandler wrote.106 To prevail in either case, a
plaintiff would have to show that “a director consciously disregarded an
obligation to be reasonably informed about the business and its risks or
consciously disregarded the duty to monitor and oversee the business.”107 Like
the shareholders in Graham, Caremark, and Stone, Citigroup’s shareholders
did not meet the burden required to impose liability on their corporation’s
directors.
Yet, if Graham focused on business practice, Citigroup (following
Caremark and Stone) grounded good faith—the little that was left of the
disinterested director’s obligations—in finance. Risk, Chandler wrote, is “the
chance that a return on an investment will be different tha[n] expected.”108
From the perspective of finance, financial institutions, just like non-financial

103. ROY C. SMITH, PAPER FORTUNES: MODERN WALL STREET: WHERE IT’S BEEN AND
WHERE IT’S GOING 36–37, 347 (2009). See also Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law
in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L. J. 113, 116–17 (2010); Michelle M.
Harnar, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1323, 1345–46 (2010);
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Citigroup: A Case Study in Managerial and Regulatory Failures, 47 IND.
L. REV. 69, 70–71, 110–11 (2014).
104. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 111.
105. Id. at 139.
106. Id. at 125.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 126.
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corporations, “make returns by taking on risk.”109 In a world of “imperfect
information, limited resources, and uncertain future,” the court would not, in
hindsight, assess whether the directors “properly evaluated risk,” be it a risk
involved in a business decision or investment.110 According to Chandler, to
impose liability on directors “for making a ‘wrong’ business decision,” even if
the decision involved monitoring, “would cripple their ability to earn returns
for investors by taking business risks” and run against “bedrock principles of
Delaware fiduciary duty law.”111 “Ultimately,” Chandler wrote,
the discretion granted directors and managers allows them to maximize
shareholder value in the long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear
that they will be held personally liable if the company experiences losses. This
doctrine also means, however, that when the company suffers losses,
112
shareholders may not be able to hold the directors personally liable.

In the end, the conceptual coherence of Delaware’s duty to monitor was
irrelevant. In relying on different standards to assess breaches of the duty to
monitor—from negligence to business judgment to good faith and finance—
the Delaware courts legitimated the erosion, if not eradication, of the duty.
My class concludes the discussion of directors’ duties by reflecting upon
the importance of state corporate law to the development of business. The
rapid growth of the stock market in the last decades of the twentieth century
and the contentment of shareholders to place their funds in the hands of
corporate managers whom corporate law have shielded from liability for
potential harm to the corporation seem to indicate a lack of correlation between
corporate law’s regulation of the corporation’s internal affairs and the
development of our market economy. History, however, suggests otherwise.
That none of the cases considered as milestones in the development of the duty
to monitor held directors liable for breach of such duty speaks volumes about
how the courts, especially the Delaware courts, view their role. By skillfully
describing directors’ duties while holding that the directors did not breach their
duties, the courts conveyed a consistent message to investors about the
competency and diligence of their corporations’ directors and executives.
Never finding directors and executives to have breached their duties, the courts
helped pacify shareholders’ concerns. With detailed analyses of the role of the
board, the appropriate standard to evaluate their duties, and the theories that
grounded corporate law, the courts ensured that both the defendants and the
plaintiffs had their day in court, thus legitimating the development of the
publicly held corporation outside the court.

109.
110.
111.
112.

In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139.

